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The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement
and Collective Bargaining
George W. Adams*
I. FTA BACKGROUND
While there has been much speculation and debate with respect to the
merits of entering into a free trade agreement with the United States,
few attempts have been made to interpret the effect of such an agreement
on specific sectors of the Canadian economy. This Article will discuss
the provisions of the Free Trade Agreement ("FTA") which is to come
into effect on January 1, 1989, and assess its likely impact on collective
bargaining.
On its face, an open trading relationship with the United States
makes sense. First, Canada is a trading nation; fully 30% of its gross
domestic product is attributable to exports. Second, 75% of that trading
activity is with the United States. As a result, Canada is both the U.S.
best customer and principal supplier. After the 1987 Tokyo Round of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") negotiations are
fully implemented, 75 to 80% of Canada-U.S. trade will occur tariff-free.
This figure does not account for non-tariff barriers ("NTBs") and the
reduction of trade in sectors where there are tariffs in place. Economists
have welcomed closer economic ties between the United States and Can-
ada on the basis that such an arrangement would create economies of
scale and specialization that would rationalize not only Canadian rela-
tionships with the United States, but also make Canada more competitive
with the rest of the world. A stable and liberal trade relationship with
the United States is therefore prima facie crucial to Canadian prosperity.
Opponents of the concept of free trade with the United States often
point to the benefits of multilateral arrangements on trade such as the
GATT. However, bilateral arrangements need not, and according to ar-
ticle XXIV of the GATT must not, inhibit multilateral trade. Moreover,
one of the aims of free trade with the United States is to rationalize Cana-
dian industry and thereby make Canada more competitive worldwide.
Proponents of the concept of free trade place great faith in the doc-
trine of comparative advantage. This doctrine provides that a country
should produce for export the commodities it produces at low cost and
import goods which it cannot so produce. The Macdonald Commission
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Report recognizes that strong sectors of the Canadian economy such as
urban transit and forestry products should respond positively to freer
trade.1
Secondary manufacturing is one major sector which may be weak-
ened by free trade.' Studies commissioned by provincial and federal gov-
ermnents and interested lobby groups have strongly disagreed as to the
net effect of free trade on the labour force, but most agree that a great
deal of adjustment will be necessary. The problem of adjustment is not a
new one in Canada. Labour markets are continually adjusting to techno-
logical change, deregulation, inflation, and currency fluctuations. The
1970 Textile Policy and the 1983 Canadian Industrial Renewal Program
have been the most comprehensive government responses to declining
sectors. However, the lack of developed intergovernmental structures in
industrial policy have increased the tendency toward "ad hocism."3 Mo-
bility programs, employment centers and single purpose agencies have
aided particular industries, but most intervention to date has been sup-
port rather than adjustment oriented.
Under the FTA, all tariffs on Canada-U.S. trade of goods are to be
eliminated in one of three manners. First, tariffs in sectors where Cana-
dian industry is competitive with American industry will be eliminated
on January 1, 1989. These areas include computers and equipment,
leather, furs, and whiskey. Second, in other industries such as subway
cars, printed matter, paints, and hardwood plywood, tariffs will be elimi-
nated in five equal steps over five years beginning on January 1, 1989.
Finally, the remaining tariffs will be eliminated in ten steps over ten years
beginning on January 1, 1989. The latter schedule will apply to: most
agricultural products, textiles and apparel, softwood plywood, railcars,
steel, appliances, pleasure craft and tires. This tripartite division is an
attempt to ease the burdens of adjustment to the FTA while allowing
some competitive sectors to take advantage of the new market immedi-
ately. Attempts are being made to completely eliminate tariffs on an in-
creased number of goods by January 1, 1989.
II. IMPACT OF THE FTA ON THE CANADIAN ECONOMY
Since at least 30% of Canada's income is derived from trade, any
agreement which affects trade relationships will necessitate significant
adjustments within the Canadian economy. Moreover, Canada accounts
for approximately 25% of America's trade, so there will be significant
adjustments within the United States as well. Many studies have looked
at the possible breadth and depth of these adjustments. However, most
of the studies conducted on the impact of free trade on industry and
1 1 MACDONALD COMMISION REPORT 343.
2 Id. at 345.
3 M. TREBILOCK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT: THE CASE OF DE-
CLINING SECTORS 43 (1986).
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labour were made before the specifics of the FTA were known. The ten
year period provided by the FTA for the elimination of tariffs means that
many of the economic models upon which conclusions have been based
will be inaccurate. The gradual elimination of tariffs will allow for an
adjustment period that a more abrupt change-producing force would not
permit.
Although the Canadian government has given assurances that the
FTA is merely an economic agreement, opponents of the Agreement sug-
gest that it is a thinly veiled attempt to destroy social welfare legislation.
Throughout the negotiations, the American negotiating team continually
referred to the need for a "level playing field" as a basis for fairer trade.
This would necessitate greater harmony with respect to national laws
concerning taxation, labour standards, collective bargaining, environ-
mental, health and safety standards, and pay equity legislation. As a re-
sult, Canadian businesses will be pressing for measures which will reduce
labour costs and will be resisting any programs that increase costs.
In Canada, the development of extensive social insurance programs
and protective labour legislation are indicative of the view that private
markets have failed to adequately protect workers. Such programs and
legislation are far less comprehensive in the United States than in almost
any other western country. For example, in the United States there is no
legislation prohibiting mandatory overtime, most workers are not pro-
tected against unjust dismissal, and only four states have adopted ad-
vance notice and severance pay requirements with respect to plant
closings.4
The Macdonald Commission found that "on balance, long-term
gains from bilateral free trade will almost certainly heavily outweigh
short-term adjustment costs."5 The proponents argue that as Canadian
firms are more completely exposed to the rigours of competition, they
will become more efficient and hence more profitable. U.S. trade action
affected (Can) $5.3 billion in Canadian exports or about 5% of total mer-
chandise exports to the United States.6 In comparison, Canadian actions
affected only about (Can) $215 million of American exports or about
0.2% of U.S. exports to Canada. It may be concluded that free trade
would involve little dislocation of Canadian primary sector workers and
may even allow for increases in employment due to stable trading envi-
ronments in forestry, potash and agriculture.
While the adjustments Canadian workers will face as a result of the
FA no doubt will be considerable, they are not likely to be greater than
the adjustments faced in the past few years as a result of fluctuating ex-
change rates and falling commodity prices. Between 1981 and 1984 at
4 8 R. EHRENBERG, RESEARCH IN LABOUR ECONOMICS B (1986).
5 MACDONALD COMMISION REPORT, supra note 1, at 333.
6 K. MACMILLAN, FREE TRADE AND CANADIAN WOMEN: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A BET-
TER FUTURE 30 (1987).
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least one million Canadian workers lost full time jobs and were not recal-
led, 36% of these being due to plant closures. Canadian and American
workers have had to perform massive adjustments in response to automa-
tion, mechanization, electronics, computers, the 1973 and 1979 OPEC
price shocks, and increased international competition. Both govern-
ments have responded to these economic alterations on a somewhat
piecemeal basis. These responses have been primarily compensatory and
made in reaction to political pressure rather than for the purpose of im-
plementing long-term adjustment proposals. Such programs have re-
warded attempts at survival in failing industries rather than encouraged
the wise utilization and re-deployment of resources. The division of pol-
icy making powers in both countries has also hindered the development
of comprehensive national industrial policies.
There can be little doubt that free trade will have a substantial im-
pact on the productivity and competitiveness of Canada's manufacturing
industries. Greater net income may result in increased government reve-
nue to support social programs geared to dealing with adjustments. The
FTA will require a restructuring of Canadian industry that will lead to
increased specialization and possibly economies of scale that will ration-
alize means of production. However, to simply extrapolate from the
elimination of tariffs and NTBs that greater economies of scale will be
created is too simplistic.
The maintenance of tariffs and quotas involve large social and pri-
vate costs from which the Canadian economy will gradually be released.
In 1978 the economic waste attributed to tariffs and NTBs in manufac-
turing industries totaled (Can) $740 million or (Can) $18,500 per job
protected.7 In 1979 the cost of tariffs and quotas on clothing imports
reviewed totaled (Can) $500 million or (Can) $33,000 per job saved.8
Such industrial assistance programs have a further cost to the economy
in that they promote the inefficient use of the country's resources.
Import restrictions have resulted in the Canadian manufacturing
sector's short production runs, excessive product diversity and sub-opti-
mal plant size. Tariffs, while not high enough to offset the greater costs
of Canadian production, make it difficult to structure facilities so as to
compete within the United States. Tariffs and NTBs also prevent third
countries from exporting to Canada's relatively small market.
The reallocation of resources within the Canadian economy will re-
quire some re-thinking of worker adjustment legislation. A common
fault of previous programs in both Canada and the United States have
been the attempts to isolate tariff and other policy changes as the sole
cause of worker displacement. Compensation programs are more effec-
7 T. HAZELDINE, THE COSTS OF PROTECTING JOBS IN 100 CANADIAN MANUFACTURING IN-
DUSTRIES 2 (1981).
8 G. GLENDAY, G. JENKINS & J. EVANS, WORKER ADJUSTMENT POLICIES: AN ALTERNA-
TIVE TO PROTECTIONISM (1982).
Vol. 14:41 1988
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tive when wider nets are thrown. Both the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 and
Canada's Labour Adjustment Benefits Program suffer from the fact they
create work disincentives because the relief provided is only receivable
while workers are unemployed. According to an Ontario Federation of
Labour paper on free trade at least 7% of the labour force will experience
"serious adjustment costs."9 It has been found that free trade will cause
a shift from labour-intensive to high-technology industries.10 Over the
long-term this will lead to increased productivity and wages; in the short-
term it signifies that a great deal of re-training will be required.
One study of the likely impact on the Canadian economy of the
FTA has estimated that 60% of new jobs will appear in the service sec-
tor. These jobs will be divided among the retail trade, the wholesale
trade, business services, and personal services.'1 Primary industries such
as forestry, agriculture and fishing will also benefit by the removal of
NTBs. Access to the large U.S. market will permit longer production
runs that will reduce unit production costs. It is also postulated that the
increased competition with the United States will increase the pace of
technological changes effected to achieve greater efficiency. 2
Industries such as rubber and plastics, leather, textiles, knitting
mills, electrical products and chemical products that are currently highly
protected will suffer from competition with low-paying American com-
panies located primarily in the southern States. Up to 10,000 jobs may
be lost in this sector, but the manufacturing sector should gain overall at
least 30,000 jobs. 3 Restrictions on Canada's imports have resulted in
excessive product diversity among Canadian manufacturing firms. This
makes them less efficient than larger scale operations in the United
States. This may partially account for the fact that Canadian manufac-
turing labour productivity was only about 74% of that found in the
United States in 1986.14
An intangible in assessing the effect of free trade is the extent to
which Canadian goods will be able to penetrate the American market.
The elimination of tariffs should reduce prices and therefore increase the
real income of consumers on both sides of the border. Also the provi-
sions of the FTA which ease the restrictions on Canadian manufacturers
servicing their products in the United States should aid export penetra-
tion. Free trade may reduce trade with third countries whose imports
are still subject to duty. However, as Canada currently conducts more
than 75% of its trade with the United States such costs are expected to
9 ONTARIO FED'N OF LAB., IT'S NOT FREE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF FREE TRADE WITH
THE U.S. 8 (1987).
10 ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADIAN PAPER No. 331, IMPACT OF CANADA-U.S. FREE
TRADE ON THE CANADIAN ECONOMY (1987) [hereinafter PAPER No. 331].
11 Au COURANT, 8 THE IMPACT OF A TRADE ACCORD 9 (1987).
12 Id. at 3.
13 ECON. COUNS. OF CAN., VENTURING FORTH 23 (1988).
14 PAPER No. 331, supra note 10, at 9.
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be minimal."5
Some of the principal findings of Paper No. 33116 were; tariff protec-
tion is high for labour-intensive manufacturing in both countries though
the rates are about 50% higher in Canada; small Canadian plants may
not be able to take advantage of scale economies unless they can be
brought up to minimum efficient scale levels; there will be an increase in
output, real income employment and investment, a reduction of prices,
government deficits and a strengthening of the Canadian dollar com-
pared to the U.S. dollar; twenty-nine of thirty-six industries studied will
experience gains in output and employment due to the indirect effects of
free trade including increased consumer expenditure and business invest-
ment; of the seven industries which will be hampered by the free trade
initiative, six are in the non-durable manufacturing sector; an estimated
gain of 251,000 jobs as a result of the creation of 439,000 jobs and the
loss of 188,000 jobs over a ten year period. The manufacturing sector
itself should gain approximately 20,000 jobs.17
These conclusions are in striking contrast to those found by an On-
tario Ministry of Industry, Trade and Technology study."8 That study
concluded that close to one-third of all jobs in Ontario's manufacturing
sector (approximately 281,000 workers) were at high risk as a result of
free trade. The study concluded that the liberalization of trade would
allow large U.S. firms to abandon their Canadian branch plants and ra-
tionalize their production facilities in areas in the United States where
labour is cheaper and workers are more adaptable to new technologies.
This conclusion explains to a large degree Premier Peterson's opposition
to free trade as Ontario will be forced to absorb much of the adjustment
costs.
It is estimated that every time a plant shuts down the situate com-
munity loses $20,000 per job in lost spending, taxes and services. 9 This
indicates that the regions most likely to suffer under the FTA are those
small communities which rely heavily upon the jobs generated by one
plant. Not only will workers face loss of employment but they will also
face a large loss in the equity value of their homes as many workers will
simultaneously decide to relocate.
III. EFFECT ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Few studies have provided insight into the effect of free trade on
industrial relations. There can be little doubt that the implementation of
15 Id. at 11.
16 Id. at 88 (As updated by the EC's VENTURING FORTH report.).
17 Id.
18 ONTARIO MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY, THE ASSESSMENT OF DI-
RECT EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF FREE TRADE FOR ONTARIO'S MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
(1987).
19 Drache, Reject Macdonald, POLICY OPTIONS POLITIQUES 22 (June 1986).
Vol. 14:41 1988
6
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 14 [1988], Iss. , Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol14/iss/10
Adams.-THE FTA & COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
the FTA, though spread over a ten year period, will require widespread
adjustment in the Canadian labour market. Moreover, labour market
adjustment issues are among the most difficult challenges a society can
face. Fortunately the FTA, with its incremental reduction of tariffs, pro-
vides some time during which government, labour and management can
develop useful and timely adjustment plans. If no coherent adjustment
policy is promulgated in advance, both the U.S. and Canadian govern-
ments may be pressured into tightening the legislated employment provi-
sions with respect to severance pay, unjust dismissals and plant closures.
If these legislative actions are not harmonized they may simply exacer-
bate existing "competitive difficulties."
Studies of worker adjustment to technological change and deregula-
tion are relevant to this discussion because they provide insight in to the
types of adjustment programs both governments should be contemplat-
ing. Some have postulated that Canadian workers will suffer under free
trade as; "[w]orkers in southern U.S. industries, working under terrible
working conditions, low standards of health and safety and sub-standard
wages may well become the bench mark for Canadian manufacturing
wages. As a result, the incomes of Canadian working families could be
severely depressed."2 0
In the short-term it seems likely that there will be a continued em-
phasis on job security through collective bargaining and legislative
change, but a closer relationship with American industry may place Ca-
nadian social programs under attack and cause labour negotiations to
parallel U.S. patterns. However, it has been argued that Canadian social
programs are declining because productivity is not increasing at a rate
sufficient to keep the programs viable.2" Increased productivity of at
least 25% as a result of free trade will cause an inflow of capital into
Canada.22 That inflow will initially drive up the Canadian dollar relative
to the U.S. dollar; in the long term it will increase productivity and allow
for the retention and the expansion of social programs. An increase in
the number of jobs should benefit the labour movement unless those jobs
are concentrated in service industries which have been difficult to
organize.
The importance of collective bargaining in Canada has increased
significantly since the Second World War. The unionized proportion of
the non-agricultural work force stood at 24% in 1945 and had increased
steadily to 40% by 1983.23 As of 1977, 86% of Canadian employees
covered by collective agreements were union members, meaning that ap-
proximately 45 to 50% of all non-agricultural workers were parties to
such agreements. However, in the United States the proportion of union-
20 U.A.W., FREE TRADE COULD COST US CANADA 8 (1987).
21 C. BEIGIE, THE IMPLICATIONS OF FREE TRADE FOR CANADIAN LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS: A MANAGEMENT VIEW 74 (1986).
22 Id. at 76.
23 2 MACDONALD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 671.
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ized non-agricultural workers declined from 35% in 1945 to 19% in
1984.
The trends in union density in Canada and in the United States
show parallel growth until approximately 1965. The later divergence oc-
curred due to differences in national laws with respect to union certifica-
tion and the duty to bargain in good faith.24 Certification procedures
provide an example of how the two countries' labour laws differ. Cana-
dian labour laws allow for certification once a specified percentage of
employees sign union cards. The U.S. system, on the other hand, re-
quires that an election take place before certification can be granted.
These elections are often hard fought and attempts to remedy unfair la-
bour practices are often met with lengthy delays. Once certification has
been won, unions still face an uphill fight as 40% of certified unions are
unable to negotiate a first contract with the employer.25 However, due to
cultural and political differences between jurisdictions, it is highly un-
likely that Canadian provinces will come to mimic U.S. labour law
developments.
During the period of 1980-82 Canada lost more time proportionally
as a result of strikes and lockouts than any other western nation. Studies
have shown that Canadian workers lost almost twice as many working
days due to labour disputes as did American workers. However, the ac-
tual number of strikes and lockouts experienced in the two countries are
very similar. It is unclear how the liberalization of trade as a result of the
FTA will affect the prevalence of strikes; however, as the two trading
partners become increasingly integrated, there will be pressure on the
Canadian and U.S. labour forces to adopt similar procedures. While job
security will continue to be a key issue, the impact on collective bargain-
ing may in large measure depend on the U.S. and Canadian labour move-
ment's ability to provide a common front in certain key industries.
Except where there are sectoral agreements, as in the case of
automobiles, the Canadian labour movement will have to be responsive
to the risk that an employer will relocate in the United States. Even in
the automotive industry at least three plants (in Bromont, Quebec, St.
Therese, Quebec, and Brampton, Ontario) may be threatened with clo-
sure by the early 1990s due to over-capacity. 26 However, many Cana-
dian unions have been dealing with the reality of potential employer
relocation for some time. For example, Northern Telecom has plants in
Tennessee as well as in Canada. Moreover, there has also always been a
concern by unions that if wage rates become too high the employer will
subcontract to a non-union firm. Therefore, while the FTA will intensify
competition between the Canada and U.S. labour markets, it does not
create novel problems.
24 Id. at 673.
25 Id. at 676.
26 Globe and Mail, Jan. 18, 1988, at B-8.
Vol. 14:41 1988
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It has been argued that Canada must develop an industrial policy
based on the formation of working groups made up of representatives of
government, business and labour.27 The likelihood of a Canadian union
adopting a common industrial policy is small, considering that their cen-
tral organization is weak and of 216 unions only 16 have more than
50,000 members. International trade unions within individual sectors
may become more influential under the FTA. Currently, Canadian la-
bour federations are dominated by public sector unions whose rights dif-
fer significantly from those of American public employees. Also,
American unions which are analogous to Canadian unions may not wish
to merge into one union since U.S. locals may be beneficiaries under the
FIA.
Models which have attempted to predict the effects on the labour
market of eliminating tariff protection have produced very diverse results
depending on the market and cost conditions used. According to one
study, some industries which are purported to be protected by tariffs are
actually hampered by them. 28 In some cases employment is actually re-
duced as a result of restricted demand for certain manufactured products
through increased prices.
The Mulroney Government has not clarified at this time whether it
intends to introduce any new programs for aiding displaced workers.
This silence is adding to the opposition to the FTA because of the fear of
the unknown. An introductory adjustment program would have as one
of its first tasks the identification of the industries which would benefit
and those which would be hurt by the new trading environment. Studies
have shown that when there is some lead time before employees are dis-
missed, adjustment programs work best because current job training is
not wasted and retraining can begin quickly. The FTA does provide lead
time in this respect. Changes to current Canadian adjustment policy
could operate through amendments to employment standards legislation.
These amendments would involve changes in advance notice, severance
pay and unjust dismissal provisions. While this would protect current
employees it would do so at the expense of new members of the labour
force. Some have argued that adjustment programs are a form of double
compensation and therefore unnecessary, as an informed worker would
take the probability of displacement into account before accepting
employment. 29
The early 1980s saw a reversal in the United States of the trend of
increasing wages, benefits and job security for workers. A new industrial
relations order, based on human resource management practices first de-
veloped in the 1960s, concession bargaining and workplace innovations,
27 Laxer, Toronto Star, Jan. 10, 1988, at 134.
28 T. HAZELDINE, supra note 8, at 66.
29 P. MARTIN, LABOR DISPLACEMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 2 (1983).
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was responsible for the reversal.30 While this order was developing, la-
bour pursued "job control unionism" with narrowly delineated tasks and
work jurisdictions within managerially-defined purposes.31
In the 1970s the American unionized industries began to feel the
effects of greater foreign competition and declining employment rates
during the recessions of 1970-71 and 1974-75. The 1980s have witnessed
the growth and diffusion of the non-union industries. The weak perform-
ance of the economy, resulting from lagging production since the late
1970s and a relatively poor performance from U.S. firms in world mar-
kets, has stimulated changes in labour relations. Other contributing fac-
tors to this non-union growth have been: greater demand for white-
collar workers, an enlarged service sector, the growth of employment in
the southern states, and the increased inclusion of women in industries
which are traditionally non-union.
During the 1970s the widening differential between union and non-
union wages made non-union operations even more attractive to employ-
ers. By the 1980s companies had introduced strategies to shut down
older, unionized plants. Management, to some extent, became more re-
sponsive to workers' needs thus reducing incentives to unionize. Simul-
taneously they began utilizing aggressive tactics to hinder the formation
and functioning of unions. The reduction of union membership was also,
in part, a function of the changing environment: changes in the structure
of the economy, increased opposition to union values, the failure of the
labour movement to develop new organization and representation strate-
gies, the increase in service sector employment, and incentives to avoid
unions due to changing competitive and cost conditions.
During the 1981-82 recession, management seeking early contract
negotiations and deregulation in the airline, trucking and communica-
tions sectors produced greater cost competition. Since then unions have
concentrated on negotiating job-security pacts. Agreements such as the
one signed in 1987"by the Ford Motor Company and General Motors
Corporation with the UAW32 protects jobs except in the case of reduced
sales. In return unions are being forced to grant employers greater flexi-
bility on the factory floor.
Another effect of the 1981-82 recession was the decentralization of
collective bargaining structures; regional and company deviations
emerged. Issue resolution switched from the national level to the com-
pany or plant level. Management increasingly bypassed union officials
and appealed directly to individual workers with plans to increase em-
30 T. KOCHAN, H. KATz & R. MAcKERSlE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS (1986) [hereinafter TRANSFORMATION].
31 T. KOCHAN & K. WEVER, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AGENDA FOR CHANGE: THE CASE OF
THE UNITED STATES 4 (1987).
32 A Demanding Yearfor Labour, BUS. WK., Jan. 11, 1988, at 34.
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ployee motivation, simplify work rules and increase flexibility in human
relations.
As a result, unions have attempted to become more involved in
management, especially in industries where unions are secure and man-
agement has no alternative but to work with them. The rise of alterna-
tive human resource management systems in the 1960s and 1970s which
emphasized employee involvement and commitment has become a part
of collective bargaining in the 1980s. Moreover, American employers
believe that if they are to compete with the newly industrialized countries
they will have to refine these techniques and specialize in areas which
make extensive use of technology. As firms become more specialized
they become smaller. This allows for even greater flexibility with respect
to human resources. It is unclear at present whether market and labour
supply conditions in the 1990s will result in massive job losses or a rela-
tively smooth period of adjustment. While it is acknowledged that the
National Labour Relations Act needs amendment to counter illegal man-
agement tactics during union representation elections and the long delays
in appeal and enforcement procedures, it is difficult to contend that the
rise of the non-union business sector is a function of this legislative
shortcoming.
The prediction that highly unionized firms are likely to continue in
the same manner as the New Deal industrial pattern may be relevant to
the Canadian environment under the FA.33 Public sector and utilities
unions in Canada will have little incentive to change as it is unlikely new
competitors will develop. In other sectors it is likely that there will be
continued pressure to moderate compensation demands and increase
flexibility to meet competitive pressures.
A U.S. study of the increased number of collective bargaining con-
tracts which involved wage concessions in the early 1980s found that two
forces were largely responsible.34 The first of these was the impact of
deregulation, mainly in the transportation and communications sectors;
the second was the increase in foreign competition due to the over-valua-
tion of the U.S. dollar. Concession contracts are settlements which in-
volve wage freezes or wage cuts in the first year of the contract. The
concession contract phenomenon began in 1979 with the bailout of
Chrysler Corporation by the U.S. federal government. In 1981, conces-
sion contracts constituted 3% of all union contracts; by 1985 this figure
had risen to 25%. Four percent of all union contracts negotiated be-
tween 1981 and 1985 involved the deregulated sector, while 5% of con-
cession contracts came from this sector. This overrepresentation of
concession contracts could be indicative of what will happen to union-
ized industries after the FTA is in force.
It is difficult to predict how free trade will affect the skill level re-
33 TRANSFORMATION, supra note 30, at 238-39.
34 D. MITCHELL, ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF UNION WAGE CONCESSIONS (1986).
11
Adams: The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and Collective Bargaining
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1988
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
quirements of the labour force. When American branch plants are ratio-
nalized with the parent company it is likely that much of the research
and development will be left to the parent. However, increased speciali-
zation in the labour market should lead to more rapid utilization of new
technologies. This, in turn, will increase demand for new training and
result in a more technically skilled work force.
Some resource based industries, such as the supplying of metals, are
linked closely to the pace of global economical activity. These industries
fluctuate wildly, experiencing periods of strong employment growth fol-
lowed by sharp reductions. As there are already large adjustment costs
present, it is unlikely that free trade will significantly alter collective bar-
gaining in this sector.
The influx of Asian goods into the North American market since the
1970s has led to several adjustments in labour-management relations.
There has been expanded employee involvement in the decision-making
process and a significant decrease in the number of job classifications. In
most cases, concessions on labour rights have been coupled with employ-
ment guarantees; therefore, it is not possible to say that the adjustments
have been entirely prejudicial to the worker. Moreover, increased com-
petition in the future has the potential of both preserving and increasing
jobs while decreasing product prices.
The evolution of labour-management relations within individual
companies and facilities has largely been determined by the strength of
the union's position. In industries where unions are entrenched, manage-
ment has increased the scope of labour-management relations to include
quality of worklife programs. In sectors with low levels of unionization,
management has adopted union avoidance schemes, reducing the incen-
tive for workers to join unions. In situations where a company maintains
facilities which are partially unionized two strategies have been favoured;
corporate resources may be targeted to non-union plants or unionized
facilities may be upgraded in exchange for more flexible job
descriptions.35
There is no doubt that the FTA will become a major bargaining
table topic and also the subject of much management planning. Unions,
as a result, may press as they have in the United States for greater partic-
ipation in business decisions. The duty to bargain and its disclosure obli-
gations may lead to more litigation in this area.
IV. CONCLUSION
According to a recent paper, "[o]ne of the striking aspects of the free
trade debate in Canada is the lack of empirical evidence on the potential
employment effects of an agreement."36 The FTA will contribute to
35 T. KocHAN & K. WEVER, supra note 31, at 33.
36 A. PORTER & B. CAMERON, IMPACT OF FREE TRADE ON WOMEN IN MANUFACTURING 10
(1987).
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changes in the collective bargaining and the industrial relations systems
but will certainly not result in the extinction of unions. Indeed, one-third
of the non-union work force see unionization as a vehicle for improving
specific job conditions. The problem for unions is finding a method for
translating this interest into membership. In contrast to American devel-
opments, public sector trade unions in Canada will continue to enhance
the institutional and political strength of unions.
It has been said that many employers in Canada have so far been
unable to gain the commitment and loyalty of their employees in their
short-term drive to maximize profits for shareholders. This is one reason
Canadian productivity has lagged so far behind Japanese productivity. It
is unclear whether the enhanced competition sanctioned by the FTA will
serve as a catalyst for a change of attitude on this front. However, forces
which have been at work since at least the late 1970s will be spurred on
by the FTA. These include: the abandonment of pattern bargaining and
wage formulas, the decentralization of bargaining structures, the realign-
ment of managerial hierarchies which lower the status of traditional in-
dustrial relations practitioners and increase the influence of human
resource specialists, the adjustment of work-rule and work organization
structures, the proliferation of wage concessions and other contractual
modifications, the development of localized and contingent compensa-
tion, the spread of team work organization, enhanced job security and
broader worker and union involvement in production and strategic
decisions.
The FTA will also increase the pressure on Canadian industry to
become more competitive both with the United States and in the interna-
tional market place. It is still unclear whether this will lead to a general
deterioration in working conditions or whether the increased rate of dif-
fusion of technological change will lead to improved working conditions.
It does seem clear that much of the labour market adjustment will arise
in Ontario and Quebec where secondary manufacturing is concentrated.
Complicating the assessment is the absence of declared government ad-
justment assistance programs at the provincial and federal levels to ease
the pressure on the affected parties. This silence may be as much a func-
tion of differences over who is going to pay for the programs as it is due
to an absence of definitive data on expected impact.
It is unlikely that the Canadian collective bargaining system will be-
come ineffectual in the same way that the U.S. system has. Canadian
unions are entrenched politically and socially in several key industries
making it more likely that the changes to be undertaken will occur
within a collective bargaining framework. For an industrial relations
system to be effective it must continually meet the goals and aspirations
of both parties. It remains to be seen whether Canadian social and em-
ployment legislation will survive the extensive adjustments which will be
required once the FTA is in place. The task of expanding the North
American industrial base while maintaining a high standard of living will
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place great pressures on the industrial relations system. Some studies
have hypothesized that the effects of the upcoming changes will be felt
disproportionately by women as they are concentrated in the most trade-
sensitive areas. Women also face greater barriers to relocation and to
retraining.
There can be no dispute, however, that this new economic accord is
certain to have a large impact on collective bargaining and indeed on
Canada itself. The FTA will contribute to current trends such as en-
hanced employee involvement, reduced job classifications and will have
similar adjustment repercussions for workers as those seen under deregu-
lation in the United States.
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